Between November 9 and 10, 2026, a hacktivist group posted on Telegram a list of Colombian government websites it claimed to have knocked offline: the Presidency, Migración Colombia, the Interior Ministry and Invest in Colombia, ProColombia’s portal for foreign investors. As MuchoHacker reported, the post was signed with tags from several groups coordinating under #OpColombia, including NoName057, a pro-Russian outfit known for this kind of campaign. For Carlos Escobar, ethical hacker and electronic engineer, the episode is a useful lesson in a threat that is cheap to launch, noisy by design and very manageable for organizations that prepare.
What actually happened
This was not a data breach. It was a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack: thousands of fake requests sent at the same time to saturate a website until it stops responding. Nobody loses information, but citizens cannot reach the service while the flood lasts.
As proof, the attackers shared reports from Check-Host, a public service that tests from dozens of countries whether a page responds. MuchoHacker found that the Invest in Colombia report from November 9 at 11:17 p.m. showed the site not responding from most of the countries tested, and taking more than 15 seconds to load from the few places where it did. The outlet could not verify the reports for the other sites, and when it published, all four were working normally.
NoName057(16) is not a mystery. In July 2025, Europol’s Operation Eastwood disrupted more than 100 servers tied to the network and took a major part of its central infrastructure offline. Europol described its members as mostly Russian-speaking sympathizers who use automated tools, operate without formal leadership or sophisticated skills, and are motivated by ideology and rewards, including cryptocurrency payments and game-like leaderboards.
Carlos Escobar, hacker: how to read a DDoS wave
The first rule is not to confuse noise with damage. A DDoS is about availability, not theft. But MuchoHacker noted that this wave came the same week that data leaks involving other Colombian entities were announced, which is exactly why a security team should treat a DDoS as a signal to check its logs, not just as a traffic problem. Attackers sometimes use the noise to draw attention away from something quieter.
The second rule is to know which kind of flood you face. Volumetric attacks try to fill the pipe with raw traffic at the network level; application-layer attacks send requests that look legitimate, such as repeated searches or logins, to exhaust servers. Volunteer tools of the kind Europol described tend to hammer specific pages, and that pattern can be filtered.
Seven countermeasures that keep a site online
- Put public sites behind a network built to absorb floods. A content delivery network with anycast and DDoS protection spreads the load across many locations, far beyond what a single data center can take.
- Hide and lock the origin server. If attackers can find the real server’s address, they will go around the shield. Accept traffic only from the protection provider.
- Cache aggressively and prepare a static fallback. Pages served from cache barely touch the origin. A lightweight static version of the home page keeps essential information available under pressure.
- Use rate limits and web application firewall rules. Limit requests per address on costly pages such as search and login, and challenge suspicious clients instead of serving them.
- Know your upstream before the crisis. Have your internet provider’s scrubbing service, contacts and escalation path written down. Calling for the first time during an attack wastes the most valuable minutes.
- Write the runbook and the message. Decide in advance who declares the incident, who talks to the provider and how users will be informed. A status page outside the main infrastructure helps.
- Measure from outside, from many countries. The same public checks attackers used as proof can be your early warning. Know your normal baseline so you can see the anomaly early.
None of this is exotic. The joint guidance from CISA, the FBI and MS-ISAC on understanding and responding to DDoS attacks lays out the same logic: prepare before, detect fast, respond with a plan.
Culture over products
Carlos Escobar insists that security is a habit, not a purchase. “Cybersecurity in 2026 is not a product you buy, it is a culture you adopt,” he said in an interview published by 45segundos in March 2026 (translated from Spanish). In the same piece he warned that “we no longer face only people in front of a screen; now we are talking about algorithms capable of learning our habits in seconds.” Hacktivist DDoS campaigns are the low-tech end of that spectrum, which is precisely why there is no excuse for being caught unprepared.
Carlos Escobar is CEO of Eliminarlos, a cybersecurity and digital-reputation firm with offices in Madrid, Bogotá and Medellín, and runs Contrahackers, his cybersecurity and threat-monitoring site. He is also academic director of Sinapsis Agent School in Laureles, Medellín, and author of the report “Cybersecurity in Colombia: what was confirmed and what was not”. Read his profile as an ethical hacker and his guide on how AI agents are attacked through prompt injection.
Sources: MuchoHacker (November 10, 2026); Europol (July 16, 2025); CISA, FBI and MS-ISAC guidance on DDoS attacks; 45segundos (March 16, 2026).